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Introduction
Fifteen-year-old Jenny Flores, fleeing oppression and civil war,
surreptitiously enters the United States to join her mother, who came
before her to establish a safe haven. Unfortunately, Jenny is appre-
hended at the border by the INS and placed in a detention cell with
adults of both sexes. She is strip searched. She is told she must make
choices. A guard tells Jenny that she will be released if her mother
comes to claim her, but the other detainees tell her that he is lying
because if her mother comes, she too will be arrested and put in
detention.
Jenny is afraid and alone.
Someone from the local legal services agency arrives to assist the
detained children. Jenny meets with the nice person who, in Spanish,
explains her options. She can voluntarily leave the United States or
present a claim for asylum. She cannot be released to a nonrelative.
Depending on her choice, she will remain in detention indefinitely, as
the asylum process is long. Requesting asylum protects her from be-
ing returned to her war-torn country, but will not free her from
confinement.
Is Jenny a good child-vulnerable and in need of protection-or
a bad juvenile, mature and capable of effectuating due process rights?
Can she simultaneously be characterized as both good and bad to ac-
complish indefinite detention? According to the United States
Supreme Court, she is both good and bad, and as a result, both her
procedural and substantive due process rights are limited in a fashion
that allows indefinite detention. The significance of the distinction is
an ever-present delineation used to determine when and how chil-
dren's due process rights will be afforded.'
Children, as nonvoting actors in society, cannot advocate for their
own rights.2 Instead, their rights are determined by others. The way
advocates and judges analyze appropriate standards for children usu-
ally fails to consider the child's concerns, actual abilities, or realities.
One such method of obscuring due process analysis of children is to
categorize them as either "good" or "bad."
1. See Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 666-67 (C.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd, 934 F.2d 991
(9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Reno v.
Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
2. See ALAN N. SUSSMAN, THiE RiGws OF YOUNG PEOPLE 13 (1977).
Adjudicatory decisions reveal an unspoken and often unrecog-
nized dichotomy between "good children" and "bad juveniles."3 In
response to this dichotomy, this Article advances a theory that re-
quires an evaluation of the individual child's ability to claim or exer-
cise due process rights. Children, as individuals in this society, are
entitled to a fair determination of their liberty interests. By rejecting
substitutes for those interests, often in the form of different character-
izations, a determination of the individual capability is advanced. Ap-
plication of this theory is necessary to ensure consideration of the
complexity of a child's reality. In the absence of this requirement, the
interests of children are often lost in the tug of war between the inter-
ests of parents and the state.4
Generally, the Supreme Court has distributed due process rights
based on an implicit categorization of youth as either good or bad.
When referring to good children, the Court has often acknowledged
the legitimacy of children's requests for due process protection, but
nevertheless denied or limited their rights.5 This denial is shielded
either by a parens patriae6 approach invoked when the rights of the
3. In this Article, I focus on the due process cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court. As a starting point, I have taken those cases identified in Susan G. Mezey,
Constitutional Adjudication of Children's Rights Claims in the United States Supreme Court,
1953-92, 27 FAM. L.Q. 307, app. at 323 (1993).
Due process cases: DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (state's duty to protect child); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (pretrial deten-
tion); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979) (proce-
dure for voluntary commitment); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (procedure for
voluntary commitment); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment in
schools); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school suspension without hearing); McK-
eiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (jury trial for juveniles); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970) (standard of proof in juvenile court); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to
counsel); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (waiver of jurisdiction by juvenile
court).
Cases implicating privacy interests, or that pit the interests of parents against the state,
are beyond the scope of this Article. Despite their exclusion, much of the analysis relevant
to the due process determinations may also apply to those cases.
4. See Jerry A. Behnke, Note, Pawns or People?: Protecting the Best Interests of Chil-
dren in Interstate Custody Disputes, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 699 (1995); infra notes 98-100
and accompanying text (demonstrating that children's rights are resolved in a bilateral na-
ture, measuring the rights of the parents and the state but not those of the child).
5. See, e.g., infra notes 66-70 (Parham v. J.R.), 96-100 (DeShaney) and accompanying
text.
6. The parens patriae power has been defined by Professor Rendleman as a mecha-
nism to protect the dependent and neglected:
Under the English common law it was recognized that "the care of all infants is
lodged in the king as parens patriae and by the kind [sic] this care is delegated to
the Court of Chancery." In protecting neglected and dependent children chan-
cery courts used what are called "equitable powers" the essential ideas of which
Winter 19961 GOOD KIDS, BAD KIDS
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state supersede those of the child,7 or a best-interest analysis invoked
when the rights of parents are supreme.' In both of these situations,
the Court has declared that the children are vulnerable and thus inca-
pable of being entrusted with the power to independently or fully ex-
ercise due process rights.9 At the same time, the Supreme Court has
granted due process rights to bad juveniles. This was not done, how-
ever, to provide meaningful protection to individuals. Instead, the
grant legitimized punishment against juveniles seen as perpetrators of
harm.' Granting due process rights in this circumstance failed to
evaluate the child's ability to effectuate those rights.
The extension of due process rights is complicated further when
unaccompanied children are suspected of being undocumented immi-
grants." Reno v. Flores" is an excellent example of when the Court's
use of language created a dichotomous characterization that
camouflages unfair treatment. In Flores, the Court applied two differ-
ent characterizations to unaccompanied, undocumented immigrant
children, both of which led to the approval of indefinite detention
are flexibility, guardianship, and a balancing of interests in the general welfare,
with a view to getting a fairer result than could be obtained by applying the older
more rigid rules.
Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L.
REv. 205, 256 (1971) (footnote omitted).
7. Limitations on the liberty interests of children are based on one of three principle
rationales rooted in the parens patriae power: "the vulnerability of minors to harm, their
lack of mature judgment, and maintenance of family authority." Lee E. Teitelbaum &
James W. Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their Application,
12 FAM. L.Q. 153, 160 (1978).
8. "The 'best interests' standard developed via the doctrine of parens patriae, and
although beyond precise definition, basically holds the child's interest 'paramount' over
other considerations." Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests
of the Child?, 1995 A.B.A. SEC. INDIVIDUAL RTs. & REsp. HUM. RTs. J. 12.
9. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
11. The majority of the children in question were sent by their parents to the United
States to escape the violence in their home country. Michael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied
Refugee Children: Detention, Due Process, and Disgrace, 2 STAN. L. & PoI'Y REv. 159,160
(1990); Peri H. Alkas, Note, Due Process Rights for Unaccompanied Alien Minors in the
United States, 14 Hous. J. I Lr'L . 365, 371 (1992) (noting the children endured acts that
make them prime candidates for the psychological condition Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder).
Yet, compare their status with the admission of unaccompanied minor children as part
of the overseas refugee program: unaccompanied children admitted to the United States as
refugees, despite holding the same status, are afforded rights that do not exist for the plain-
tiff children in Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993). The refugee children are not held in
detention facilities, but placed in homes subject to "home study evaluations." For a further
analysis of these children's rights, see Daniel J. Steinbock, The Admission of Unaccompa-
nied Children into the United States, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 137, 154-69 (1989).
12. 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
while eliminating or minimizing their substantive and procedural due
process rights.' 3 The Court determined that unaccompanied minors
had neither a substantive due process right of release from INS deten-
tion,'14 nor a procedural due process right to an automatic review of
their custody by the INS.'5 As a result, indefinite detention of minors
by the INS was accomplished by reducing the due process liberty right
of freedom from confinement to little more than a hollow slogan.
Part I of this Article defines the categories of "good children"
and "bad juveniles," examines the definition of "good children" in his-
torical context, and provides the same analysis for "bad juveniles."
Part II further develops these categories by examining selected United
States Supreme Court cases. This examination reveals that the Court
grants due process rights to "bad children," and denies such rights to
"good children.' 16
Part III focuses on Reno v. Flores and evaluates the different
characterizations used by the Court in the decision. It finds that the
difference in language used to characterize the children sheds some
light on the "packaging" of children, which in turn shapes the Court's
perception and, hence, the rights that will be extended to them. Part
IV concludes that due process rights of children should be decided on
13. This Article will not address the overriding issue of plenary power that exists in the
area of immigration law. Justice Scalia refers to this doctrine, citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977) and Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) in support of the denial of
rights, stating: "If we harbored any doubts as to the constitutionality of institutional cus-
tody over unaccompanied juveniles, they would surely be eliminated as to those juveniles
(concededly the overwhelming majority of all involved here) who are aliens." Flores, 113
S. Ct. at 1449. Although the plenary power is articulated, it is not the focus of the Court's
analysis and will not be the focus of this Article. For a more in-depth analysis of the scope
of the plenary power issue, and its potential influence on this issue as an issue involving
immigration, see Arthur C. Helton, The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the United States,
14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 353,367 (1986); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 965, 972-91.
14. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1447.
15. Id. at 1450-51.
16. Due process analysis traditionally states that until the deprivation is significant,
there is not an entitlement of rights, and at the same time, the entitlement increases with
increases in deprivation. See John Denvir, Justice Rehnquist and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 34 HAsTiNGs LJ. 1011, 1019 (1983) (noting the first step in due process analysis is
identification of property or liberty interest at stake); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(adopting due process protections in juvenile proceedings designed to effectuate punish-
ment). Despite this analysis, however, the use of categorization may obscure whether due
process rights are applied in a particular context since children's conduct may sometimes
be innocent and culpable at the same time. See, e.g., Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993). For this
reason, the revelation about the significance of the categories contributes significantly to
the legal discourse.
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a case-by-case basis in the context of the right advanced, without be-
ing obscured by a "good" or "bad" characterization of the class or
individual child. This approach would focus on the ability of the child
and thus facilitate protection of constitutional liberty interests covered
by the Due Process Clause.
L Defining the Classes
The use of two different categories to characterize children be-
comes apparent when the language of juvenile welfare dependency
and neglect cases and civil commitment cases is compared with lan-
guage used in juvenile adjudications involving criminal acts. 17 The
former cases speak of the parties as vulnerable children in need of the
protection of parents or the state.18 In the latter cases, the children
are labeled as juvenile delinquents or mature individuals capable of
comprehending consequences and able to make choices about their
actions. Accordingly, punishment may be imposed as a consequence
of their bad acts.' 9 The existence of punishment, or perceived punish-
ment, is important in establishing when due process rights will be ex-
tended to juveniles.2 °
Categorizing children as good or bad minimizes their due process
rights both as individuals and as "persons"'2' within the meaning of the
Constitution, allowing for an amorphous shifting of their rights. Good
children's rights are limited by invoking parens patriae power.22 The
17. Generally speaking, delinquents are children charged with criminal law viola-
tions, whereas children in need of supervision are status offenders, that is, they
are charged with committing acts that are illegal only for minors, such as truancy
or running away from home. In contrast, in the neglect cases, it is the parents
who are accused of mistreating their offspring.
Irene M. Rosenberg, Essay, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court
Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 163, 165 n.6.
18. Justice Powell advanced this theory in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979),
justifying the limitations on children due to "the peculiar vulnerability of children." This
was also the notion which formed the foundations of the creation of juvenile courts. See
Mack, infra note 20, at 109-10.
19. The notion of delinquency has also evolved to the point where the term connotes
criminal behavior. At least one juvenile court judge has advocated for the extension of
commitment laws and reduction in the privacy rights that have surrounded the juvenile
court process. See Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There
Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 57, 83-93 (1992).
20. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. Compare the early development of the
juvenile court process where reformers, in fashioning the juvenile court, worked to elimi-
nate punishment to remove the stigma associated, with adjudication in adult criminal
courts. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 109-10 (1909).
21. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
22. See Mack, supra note 20, at 109-10.
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Court has justified upholding the power of parents by stating that the
children are vulnerable and in need of protection not provided by the
parents.23
Similarly, rights of bad juveniles are also limited because
"juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody."'2 4 Thus,
there is no need to evaluate their ability to exercise rights. When
rights are granted, it is used to justify the retributive power of the
state over the child.' Additionally, granting a right presumes matur-
ity on the part of the juvenile without determining whether the indi-
vidual choices are consistent with constitutional norms as applied to
adults.26
The following sections more closely analyze attributes that the
United States Supreme Court has assigned to good children and bad
juveniles, and explores the dichotomous treatment in its historical
context.
A. The "Good Children"
Early reformers placed an emphasis on the need to protect the
"vulnerable youth" in society.27 They spoke of children as innocent,
wayward, and in need of guidance that was either lacking or insuffi-
cient in the home.28 To ensure protection for these youth, the early
23. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
24. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (citing Lehman v. Lycoming County
Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1982)).
25. See, e.g., Nat Stem, The Burger Court and the Diminishing Constitutional Rights of
Minors: A Brief Overview, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 865, 865 (noting under the Burger Court
there was a clear move away from a recognition of independent constitutional rights for
children in favor of a "excessive ascendancy of the state").
26. The range of constitutional autonomy that may be claimed by children is not coex-
tensive with that of adults. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 7, at 159. This position should
be contrasted with the conclusions of Professor Melton, who states: "The capacity to per-
ceive and evaluate the intentionality of behavior does not translate directly into the capac-
ity to form criminal intent." Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New
Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REv. 146, 155 (1989); see generally Scharf & Hess, infra note 49
(noting the studies of Professor Grisso demonstrate that, in the constitutional context, mi-
nors do not exercise their rights).
27. See generally Barbara B. Woodhouse, Children's Rights: The Destruction and
Promise of Family, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 497, 500 & nn.8-9 (describing early state interven-
tion into decisions traditionally made by the family).
28. That the originators of the juvenile court system viewed children as basically good
is demonstrated by the object of the court "was invariably referred to as 'the child,' the
'boy or girl' or 'the lad.' Calling teenaged lawbreakers 'children' was not disingenuous
rhetoric. Rather, it demonstrates that the social construction of adolescence as a species of
childhood powerfully informed the ideology and practice of the parens patriae juvenile
court." Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083, 1101 (1991).
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juvenile courts were designed in a manner broad enough to allow the
state to both assist parents with difficult, unruly children and take chil-
dren from parents incapable of caring for them.29 To implement these
objectives, status offenses, such as truancy and curfew violations, as
well as dependency and neglect proceedings, evolved for the "protec-
tion" of the child.3"
In the early 1900s, the parens patriae power emerged from com-
monlaw chancery to justify action by the state against parents,31 and
supplanted the custody rights of parents and the liberty interests of
children. The liberty interests of children were also limited by a "best
interest" analysis that emerged in civil custody determinations.32 The
common theme of both doctrines was that children are unable to pro-
tect themselves. 33 Two convergent theories about the nature of chil-
dren supported their inability to make independent choices.' The
first was a Calvinist doctrine, which focused on the badness of chil-
dren, characterizing the young as "inherently sinful and doomed to
spiritual death."'35 The second was an Enlightenment approach, in
which children were viewed as "innately innocent beings, 36 advanc-
ing the philosophy that good children, in their own interest, required
nurturing and protection by the state and parents.37 Additionally, the
29. See Mack, supra note 20, at 113. Alternatively, Professor Rendleman notes that
the distinction between "those [children] who were threatened by their environment and
those who were objective threats to the environment," arose from a duality in treatment
deriving from poverty versus criminality. Rendleman, supra note 6, at 215 (providing an
excellent treatment of the history of this duality and its effect on the current state of the
parens patriae doctrine).
30. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993) (status offense); supra text accom-
panying note 8.
31. The parens patriae power came to represent the power of the state to control by
"either analogy to the chancery power of parens patriae" or by the inherent sovereignty of
the state to protect the interests of children. Rendleman, supra note 6, at 240.
32. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 7 (1979).
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children articulated this best interest
approach and its deference to parents or others who are legally responsible parties in as-
sessing whether the best interest is achieved. See Roger J.R. Levesque, The International-
ization of Children's Human Rights: Too Radical for American Adolescents?, 9 CONN. J.
INT'L. L. 237, 277 n.195 (1994); infra note 297.
33. See Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1038-41 (1992) (discussing rise of chil-
dren's rights as a contrast to other movements).
34. See Ainsworth, supra note 28, at 1093-94. In addition, there is great debate about
the emergence of a reconstructed view of childhood. For an excellent treatment of the
competing notions of children, see Levesque, supra note 32, at 243-52.
35. Ainsworth, supra note 28, at 1093.
36. Id. at 1094.
37. Id
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emergence of ideas or beliefs that indicated children were different
than adults furthered a shift in the treatment of children.38 Criminal
culpability was linked to new discoveries about the different develop-
mental stages and reasoning assigned to children.39 It generally was
agreed that these stages could more effectively be molded by guidance
and treatment rather than through punishment.40
Coinciding with a notion of the parens patriae power as authoriz-
ing state responsibility for wayward children, who were viewed as
members of a vulnerable class,4' the early juvenile courts replaced
adult courts.42 Based on the notion that the children were in need, the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court was designed to provide guidance
and rehabilitation and protect society at large by isolating them.43
The next section briefly examines how the "bad juvenile" theory
emerged from reform efforts which presumed badness or wrong-doing
on the part of offenders.44 Today's philosophy prevails to the extent
that treatment and rehabilitation are nearly forgotten. Juveniles
viewed as bad are systematically taken out of juvenile courts and
38. Id.
39. Patricia H. Miller, Theories of Adolescent Development, in THE ADoLEscErr AS
DECISION-MAKER, 13-46 (Judith Worrell & Fred Danner eds., 1989) (summarizing the vari-
ous theories of adolescent development); see also Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the
Choice Between Rules and Standards, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 351, 386-89 (discussing the re-
search of culpability for minors).
40. "Early child guidance clinics developed around the juvenile court system, in which
due process concerns for the respondents' personal liberty were sacrificed in the name of
'treatment,' often for noncriminal behavior that was, though perhaps bothersome, arguably
a product of 'normal' adolescent groups." Gary B. Melton & Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Ethical
and Legal Issues in Mental Health Services for Children, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCHOLOGY 1035, 1036 (C. Eugene Walker & Michael C. Roberts eds., 2d ed. 1992).
41. As noted above, during the 1800s, a shift occurred that moved the state to inter-
vene in cases where, by legislative definition, children who were suffering, abandoned, ne-
glected, or improperly exposed to harm, became the target of child saving societies.
Rendleman, supra note 6, at 226.
42. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 824 (1988) ("The juvenile
court movement attempted to remove children from the adult criminal justice and correc-
tions systems and provide them with individualized treatment in a separate system."); see
also Levesque, supra note 32, at 249-50 n.50.
43. Claudia Worrell, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection
Masked by the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE Li. 174, 176 (1985). At the same time,
common-school movements emerged, which Levesque argues was an effort to subjugate
working class and immigrant children. See Levesque, supra note 32, at 249 n.50.
44. See Martha G. Duncan, In Slime and Darkness: The Metaphor of Filth in Criminal
Justice, 68 TUL. L. REv. 725,788-92 (1994) (noting two of the early movements designed to
"save children," the Houses of Refuge and the Orphan Train Movement, were regimented
and designed to pull the youths from their former "dirty" environments into areas of order
and cleanliness, a notion consistent with retrieving the children from badness).
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treated as adults to exact greater punishment a.4  The distinctions be-
tween children who are good and juveniles who are bad is demon-
strated by the current treatment of bad juveniles.
B. The "Bad Juveniles"
"From a world in which the child by definition was morally inca-
pable of committing a crime, we have now passed to a world in which
juveniles are to be held strictly accountable for their crimes. 4 6 As the
juvenile court was established as a mechanism to divert troubled
youth from adult criminal courts, diversion to juvenile court provided
an alternative to punitive sanctions in the form of treatment or reha-
bilitation.47 At the outset, courts distinguished between bad juveniles,
who needed rehabilitation through isolation from society, and good
children, who needed protection from adverse social conditions.4 8
Once categorized as bad, juveniles were placed in either juvenile
delinquency proceedings that resemble criminal trials or adult crimi-
nal trials.49  Since In re Gault,50 substantial procedural protections
have developed in juvenile proceedings.5 1 The addition of these safe-
45. As if the gunshots summoned them, legislators in Colorado, Utah, and Flor-
ida met in special sessions this fall and enacted measures making it easier to pros-
ecute teen-agers as young as 14 as adults. A half-dozen other states took similar
steps earlier this year, and many more are considering them.
Laura Mansnerus, Treating Teen-Agers as Adults in Court: A Trend Born of Revulsion,
N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 3, 1993, at B7.
46. See Ainsworth, supra note 28, at 1105 (emphasis added).
47. Id- at 1100-01; see, e.g., Martin, supra note 19, at 60 n.8, 65-68 (chronicling the
history of the juvenile court movement); Sarah H. Clark, Note, Substantive Due Process in
a State of Flux: Should Courts Develop New Fundamental Rights for Alien Children?, 72
B.U. L. REv. 579, 582 (1992).
48. See Mack, supra note 20, at 121-22 (The purpose of the juvenile system "'is to help
all it can, and to hurt as little as it can; it seeks to build character-to make good citizens
rather than useless criminals. The state is thus helping itself as well as the child, for the
good of the child is the good of the state."') (citation omitted).
49. This Article will not address the issue of children in adult courts. The due process
rights afforded to children in this context, however, may not be meaningful if, as the data
suggests, the children are incapable of exercising the rights competently. See Irene Scharf
& Christine Hess, Comment, What Process is Due? Unaccompanied Minors' Rights to De-
portation Hearings, 1988 DUKE L.J. 114, 115. Furthermore, where the transfers are being
made to adult criminal court, there is an increasing tendency to do so without evaluating
the nature of the offender as was traditional in the juvenile court. Today, the transfers are
being made under automatic waiver statutes, which are defined by the offense and not by
the offenders' amenability to be rehabilitated. Ainsworth, supra note 28, at 1112.
50. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
51. Gault held that the Due Process Clause required in an adjudicatory stage of a
juvenile court proceeding: written notice to the child and his parent or guardian, id. at 33;
notice of right to have counsel or to have counsel appointed if the party is unable to afford
counsel, id. at 41; notice of the right to remain silent since the privilege against self-incrimi-
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guards created a shift in perception about the purpose of the juvenile
court. Rather than rehabilitating or treating youth, juvenile courts,
viewed as protecting society from the dangers posed by the youth, in-
creased punishment against juvenile offenders. 2 Today, instead of fo-
cusing on particular individual needs, juvenile courts often focus on
the punishment that should follow from the harm done by juveniles,
even facilitating punishment rather than providing protection and re-
habilitation. 3 With an increase in punitive action facilitated by the
procedural protections, which themselves had been justified by the
punitive nature of the penalty imposed, there has been a decrease in
the application of the parens patriae doctrine. The juvenile court now
substantially mirrors the adult system by emphasizing punishment, but
unlike adults, children are limited in their ability to exercise rights. 4
Today, society acts vigorously to punish bad juveniles under the
belief that they possess maturity and well-developed cognitive skills.
This approach supports a growing movement to hold juveniles ac-
countable for criminal conduct in adult instead of juvenile courts.5
Courts, legislatures, and the public justify this return of juvenile of-
fenders to adult courts with data casting juvenile offenders as increas-
nation applies, id. at 55; and that the right to confrontation applies, id. at 56-57. But see
Feld, supra note 42, at 822 ("Affording juveniles procedural parity with adults as a prelude
to punishment, however, raises the issue of whether there is any need for a separate juve-
nile system.").
52. See Feld, supra note 42, at 882-83 (noting a shift from focusing on the characteris-
tics of the offender to a focus on the offense).
53. Id.; see also Alan Sussman, Practitioner's Guide to Changes in Juvenile Law and
Procedure, 14 CRIM L. BULL 311,311 (1978) (noting trend toward increased punishment in
juvenile court); Teitelbaum, supra note 39, at 351-52 (describing an increase in juvenile
court orders related to the offense and harm done rather than the child's personal needs).
54. See, e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 28, at 1105 ("As a consequence of the general
disillusionment with rehabilitative penology, the focus of the criminal justice system turned
from assessing the social needs of the offender to assessing the social harm that the of-
fender caused-in short, from rehabilitation to retribution."); see also McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 546 n.6 (1971) (reiterating that "'the guiding consideration for a
court of law that deals with threatening conduct is nonetheless protection of the commu-
nity"') (citation omitted).
55. Compare Mansnerus, supra note 45, at B7 with Martin, supra note 19, at 83-89
(juvenile court judge advocating, as a remedy to the perceived problem of dangerous
juveniles, the elimination of the shield of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings and in-
creasing periods of confinement).
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ingly more violent,56 thus possessing sufficient maturity to be granted
rights 7 and receive severe, adult-style punishment.58
Even when rights are extended, however, children are not
brought into parity with adults. Instead, the grant of rights legitimates
punishment of youth for the harm they have inflicted, while simulta-
neously disadvantaging youth who are not capable of maturely exer-
cising those rights.59
The next part of this Article evaluates due process cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court to illustrate the different lan-
guage patterns of good children and bad juveniles when discussing
whether due process rights apply. The language is significant because
it acts as a short cut in due process analysis. The rights of good chil-
dren are limited because they are vulnerable, while the rights of bad
juveniles are granted to justify exacting retributive punishment, with-
out assessing the ability of the child.
H. The Distinctions Applied
A. The Good Children
Categorizing children as good has the unfortunate effect of deny-
ing or limiting their due process rights. Due process rights are not
afforded to good children because they are believed to be vulnerable,
56. See Kristina H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles in
Adult Jails, 66 IND. L.J. 999, 1002-03 (1991) (arguing violent behavior is on the rise because
of gangs and drugs); Michael J. Dale, The Supreme Court and the Minimization of Chil-
dren's Constitutional Rights: Implications for the Juvenile Justice System, 13 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y. 199, 201 (1992) [hereinafter Dale, Minimization of Children's Constitu-
tional Rights] (noting perceptions held about juveniles include the notion that children and
schools are more violent); Michael J. Dale, Children Before the Supreme Court: In Whose
Best Interests?, 53 ALB. L. REv. 513, 521 (1989) [hereinafter Dale, Children Before the
Supreme Court] (noting the appearance of violence was accompanied by a "need to 'get
tough' with children [that] was embraced by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts"); Man-
snerus, supra note 45, at B7 ("'Juveniles have become more violent and deadly, and kill at
much younger ages.' said Chuck Quackenbush, a Republican in the California State As-
sembly .... ). Contra Teitelbaum, supra note 39, at 370 (asserting there is "little evidence
to support the claim that violent behavior by or against children is greater now than in the
past").
57. See Dale, Minimization of Children's Constitutional Rights, supra note 56, at 201;
see also Strater, supra note 8, at 10-11 (noting "'with every brutal crime by a child, a trou-
bled nation demands longer jail sentences, tougher treatment, even the death penalty-
anything to stop the violence."') (citation omitted).
58. Melton, supra note 26, at 153 ("In fact, if research contradicts the Piagetian hy-
pothesis at all, it generally is in the direction of competence of even younger minors to
make personal decisions."); see also infra notes 187-199 and accompanying text.
59. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 723 (1979); infra notes 197-199 and accompa-
nying text.
a condition that makes them either incapable of effectively or know-
ingly executing rights, or otherwise in need of an overriding parens
patriae protection vested in the state.60 The effect of this approach is
a de facto limitation of children's rights, which is often justified as
being in the best interest of the child.6 1 The following cases demon-
strate the effect of the good child-bad juvenile dichotomy in mental
health, child protection, corporal punishment, and criminal cases. In
each of these areas, the rights of children are limited or denied alto-
gether by a superior interest of the state or the parents acting on be-
half of the child.
1. The Mental Health Confinement Case
Parham v. J.R.62 demonstrates the use of the good child language,
which effectively limits a recognized due process right to freedom.
a. The Majority Opinion
In finding that commitment to one of eight regional hospitals in
Georgia constituted a "severe deprivation of a child's liberty,"63 the
district court held that the procedural due process required to protect
this liberty interest "'include[d] at least the right after notice to be
heard before an impartial tribunal."'" It also found a substantive due
process requirement to give "nonhospital treatment to those members
of appellees' class who would benefit from it."65
In reversing, the Supreme Court summarily acknowledged the
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause,66 and noted that,
notwithstanding a child's liberty interest, "in the voluntary commit-
ment setting .... parents ... retain a substantial, if not the dominant,
role in the decision."67 By justifying the need for parental decision-
making, the majority focused on the vulnerability of the children and
60. See Dale, Minimization of Children's Constitutional Rights, supra note 56, at 222
(noting the reformulization of the parens patriae approach has minimized the rights of
children); see also William S. Geimer, Juvenileness: A Single-Edged Constitutional Sword,
22 GA. L. REv. 949, 972 (1988) (arguing protectionist attitudes toward children are in-
voked to deny rights to juveniles).
61. The parens patriae power is often used to justify substantial infringements on the
liberty interests of children. See Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights:
Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1163, 1168 (1984).
62. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
63. Id. at 597.
64. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 137 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd sub nom. J.R. v.
Parham, 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
65. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 597.
66. Id. at 600.
67. Id. at 604.
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applied the good-child prong of the dichotomy to limit the child's
choice for freedom from detention.6" Such reasoning minimizes a
constitutional right solely because the person exercising the right is a
minor construed as a vulnerable child.
The Supreme Court, in its reasoning, looked at procedures used
in commitments instituted by parents and the state. The Court noted
that the child had an interest in not being committed, but stated that
"since this interest is inextricably linked with the parents' interest in
and obligation for the welfare and health of the child, the private in-
terest at stake is a combination of the child's and parents' concerns."69
When the parents were the moving parties, there was a presumption
on the part of the Court that the parents, "absent a finding of neglect
or abuse," played a major role in the decisionmaking process and
were guided by the "best interests" of the child.71
The language used by the Court in describing the class captures
the good child image. The two named parties, J.L. and J.R., were re-
ferred to as "the child" 71 and "a neglected child"72 respectively. Con-
sistently throughout the opinion, references were made to these
individuals as "children" not capable of independently exercising a
constitutional right simply because they were children. The Court dis-
tinguished these children from the "bad juveniles" of Gault by noting
that the effect of a ruling of commitment is not the equivalent of "be-
ing labeled by the state as delinquent, criminal, or mentally ill and
possibly dangerous. '73 They were further distinguished as good chil-
dren when the Court noted that the power of the parents to act in the
child's best interest was found in the law's concept of the family,
which "rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks
in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for mak-
ing life's difficult decisions." 74 The vulnerability of the children was
reinforced when the Court noted: "Most children, even in adoles-
cence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many
decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment. '75 This
sort of reasoning limits the liberty interest advanced by the children.
The power of the parents, subject to agreement of an examining physi-
68. See id. at 613-15.
69. Id. at 600 (footnote omitted).
70. Id- at 604.
71. Id. at 589.
72. Id. at 590.
73. Id. at 600.
74. Id. at 602.
75. Id. at 603.
cian, preempted the district court's conclusion that the children's con-
stitutional liberty interest had been violated and precluded an
independent analysis of their individual abilities to exercise due pro-
cess rights.76
The interests of the child are also subordinated to those of the
state. The majority concluded that no additional procedural require-
ments were necessary when the state was the moving party.7 7 Citing a
state statute that created a presumption that the state will act in the
best interests of the child,78 the Court found that the agency was act-
ing in loco parentis. 79 This power, linked to the parens patriae power,
further subjected the constitutional rights of the child to state author-
ity. The underlying notion was that the child's desire for freedom was
too ill-informed to be weighed against the interests advanced by the
parents or state.
b. The Dissent
The dissent referred to the class experiencing unwanted confine-
ment as "Georgia's institutionalized juveniles, 8 0 thereby rejecting the
vulnerable good child portrayal of the majority opinion in favor of an
image of mature juveniles. The dissent would have vested maturity,
not vulnerability, in the class. The existence of maturity, in turn, justi-
fied granting constitutional rights that presumptively can be exercised
by the class. These rights would obligate the state to provide postcom-
mitment hearings in cases where the parents seek to voluntarily com-
mit juveniles, and precommitment hearings where the state seeks
commitment.81 Contrasting this situation with privacy cases, in which
full due process rights were extended to the parties,' the dissent justi-
fied limited intervention by the parents because of a break in familial
structure deriving from the illness of the juvenile.8 3 Using a balancing
76. See id. at 604.
77. Il at 617-18.
78. Id. at 618; see GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-101 (1996).
79. Parham, 442 U.S. at 619.
80. Id. at 625, 634 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. Id. at 633, 635, 638-39 (noting both hearings would have appointed representatives
for the interest of the minors).
82. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976).
83. Parham, 442 U.S. at 635 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see supra note 3 (privacy cases are beyond the scope of this Article). As raised in Dan-
forth, however, the distinction between the legitimate privacy interest of the "child" turned
on the Court's perception of the family relationship and an individual assortment of the
minor's decisionmaking ability. In Parham, "a break in the family autonomy has actually
resulted in the parents' decision to surrender custody of their child to a state mental insti-
tution." Parham, 442 U.S. at 631. This distinction does not eliminate the possibility of
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test, however, that weighs the individual assessment of the child
against a medical determination of need,' the dissent only found pro-
cedural due process sufficiently protected where a postcommitment
hearing was provided." The dissent's approach would have required
procedural due process, making the test consistent with procedural
protection afforded in adult commitment cases.86
The dissent also rejected the paternalistic parens patriae notion
advanced in support of the state's authority to commit the children,
noting that the social worker-child relationship should not be given
the deference accorded to parents.87 Doing so, the dissent argued,
would be the equivalent of stating that "criminal trials are unneces-
sary since prosecutors are not supposed to prosecute innocent per-
sons."'88 Where a child is a ward of the state, the dissent would have
required a precommitment hearing, equating the commitment process
to a criminal proceeding89 and characterizing the treatment as "con-
finement." 9° Accordingly, because good children are punished in the
same way that bad juveniles are punished, they should also be given
rights. Carefully avoiding language that portrayed the class as chil-
dren, the dissent focused on the confinement of juveniles. Its choice
of language powerfully argued for heightened protection when pun-
ishment is at issue.91
In Parham, both the majority and dissent used language to create
images about the class. By serving as a short-hand method of deter-
mining whether due process rights should exist, the images minimized
a true constitutional analysis based on the facts of the case. Under
this framework, the children's desire-and constitutional right-to be
adopting standards consistent with the cases as a remedy to blanket categorizations of
children.
84. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 635.
85. Id. at 633.
86. Id. at 627. For an excellent discussion of the right of competent adults to make
treatment decisions and the methods employed by the court in balancing paternalism and
autonomy, see Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme
Court's Reckless Disregard for Self-Determination and Social Science, 37 ViaL. L. REV.
1569, 1581-86 (1992).
87. Parham, 442 U.S. at 638.
88. Id. at 637.
89. Id
90. Id. at 638.
91. Some would argue that this is the basis of all extensions of due process; however, I
contend that the extension of due process is accorded and punishment exacted because the
class is characterized as bad juveniles. This is apparent when contrasting the dissent's char-
acterization with that of the majority. In each instance the same children exist, but the
descriptions are different. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
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free from unwanted confinement was not independently evaluated be-
cause the categories determine when rights are appropriate. Similarly,
in the following case, a four-year-old child's due process rights were
subordinated to the right of his father.
2. The Child Protection Case
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
the majority opinion declared that the state's failure to protect an in-
dividual against private violence did not constitute a substantive viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause.92 The Court held that the Clause
imposed no duty on the state "to provide members of the general pub-
lic with adequate protective services." 93 The Due Process Clause, the
Court reasoned, "is a limitation on the [s]tate's power to act, not.., a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security."'9 4 Accord-
ingly, while the clause forbids the state itself from depriving individu-
als of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, it cannot
be read "to impose an affirmative obligation.., to ensure that those
interests do not come to harm through other means." 95
The approach of the DeShaney Court is one more example of the
limitations placed on the due process rights of minors classified as vul-
nerable children. Joshua, the four-year-old victim of his father's
abuse, was often paternalistically described as a "child."9 6 In this case,
the rights of Joshua were subordinated to the greater rights of both his
father and the state. The Court acknowledged that Joshua was his
father's victim, but found that the state, although aware of his plight,
had no affirmative duty to act to protect him.97 Articulating a belief
that it was acting in Joshua's best interest, the Court deferred to
Joshua's father. The Court reinforced its opinion by claiming that any
state action taken without certainty of danger to Joshua would have
92. 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
93. Id at 197; see Laura Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive
Due Process: DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REv. 659, 684 (1990) ("In DeShaney the
Court rejected the argument that certain 'special relationships' created or assumed by the
state with respect to particular individuals impose an affirmative constitutional duty on the
states to protect citizens.").
94. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
95. Id at 194-97.
96. Id at 194.
97. [T]he harms Joshua suffered occurred not while he was in the State's custody,
but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state
actor. While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in
the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render
him any more vulnerable to them.
Id at 201.
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been premature and may have subjected the state to a due process
action by his father.98 Although the Court was sympathetic to
Joshua's plight,99 the parental authority of his father, accompanied by
a presumption that he acted in the best interest of Joshua, precluded
state responsibility. Joshua's independent claims of freedom from
physical harm at the hands of his father were without constitutional
recourse because he was categorized as a good child whose due pro-
cess interests were best determined by others.' 0
Illustrating that the position of the majority was not the only posi-
tion consistent with prior precedent, the dissent relied on Estelle v.
Gamble'01 and Youngberg v. Romeo, 02 cases which also imposed due
process responsibility on the state. Equating Joshua's plight with that
of the "incarcerated individuals" in these other cases, 0 3 the dissent
introduced the bad juvenile aspect of the dichotomy and recharacter-
ized Joshua. The juvenile language was used not to conclude that
Joshua was a bad child, but to argue for the application of higher due
process protection by distancing Joshua from the vulnerable child lan-
guage used by the majority to deny him rights as a victim subject to
parental authority. 04
In DeShaney, both the majority and dissenting opinions barely
acknowledged the existence of the victim, focusing instead on the tug
98. The most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that they
stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active
role for them. In defense of them it must also be said that had they moved too
soon to take custody of the son away from the father, they would likely have been
met with charges of improperly intruding into the parent-child relationship,
charges based on the same Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the pres-
ent charge of failure to provide adequate protection.
Id at 203.
99. "Judges and lawyers, like other humans, are moved by natural sympathy in a case
like this to find a way for Joshua and his mother to receive adequate compensation for the
grievous harm inflicted upon them." AL at 202-03.
100. For an excellent discussion of the family violence aspects of the case, and a rejec-
tion of the bright line custody test adopted by the Court, see Oren, supra note 93, at 700-
17.
101. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
102. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
103. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("This initial action rendered
these people helpless to help themselves or to seek help from persons unconnected to the
government."); see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 ("It is but just that the public be required to
care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for him-
self.") (citation omitted); Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317 ("When a person is institutional-
ized-and wholly dependent on the State-it is conceded by petitioners that a duty to
provide certain services and care does exist .... ).
104. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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of war between the father and the state. 10 5 This treatment resulted in
a decision that did not address the individual liberty interests of
Joshua, demonstrating why Joshua's separate constitutional standing
should not be determined by a classification as either a good or bad
child. The dissent urged that the constitutional analysis must focus
rather on a child's liberty interest to be free from physical abuse, but
could not afford Joshua protection under the current approach since
rights of minors are nonexistent in the face of the superior right of
parents.' 06
The next section reveals a similar result in corporal punishment
cases, where good children are denied procedural protection because
the superior parens patriae power articulated by the school minimizes
the individual liberty claims of the students.
3. Good Children and the Eighth Amendment
In Ingraham v. Wright, the Court described the class as one com-
prised of "recalcitrant student[s]' '1 0 7 who received punishment as part
of a long "'accepted method of promoting good behavior and instil-
ling notions of responsibility and decorum into the mischievous heads
of school children.""0 " The Court framed the issue as one involving
minor correction for the benefit of the student, and reinforced this
notion by asserting that "limited corporal punishment may be neces-
sary in the course of a child's education."' 1 9 In this situation, "there
can be no deprivation of substantive rights as long as disciplinary cor-
poral punishment is within the limits of the common-law privilege."' "0
Thus, Ingraham is another illustration of the Court allowing an
infringement on an otherwise recognized constitutional right."' In
finding that a school child could be disciplined as a method of bringing
responsibility to her "mischievous head," the Court emphasized that
105. See generally Oren, supra note 93.
106. 489 U.S. at 203-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since there was not an adjudication
against the father terminating his rights, the parens patriae power of the state to intervene
was limited. Id. at 201.
107. 430 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
108. Ingraham, 525 F.2d 909, 917 (5th Cir. 1976), quoted in Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 656.
109. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676.
110. Id. "At common law a single principle has governed the use of corporal punish-
ment since before the American Revolution: Teachers may impose reasonable but not ex-
cessive force to discipline a child." Id. at 661.
111. The Court acknowledged that "corporal punishment in public schools implicates a
constitutionally protected liberty interest, but [held] that the traditional common-law rem-
edies are fully adequate to afford due process." Id. at 672.
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"discipline" is distinct from punishment." 2 The Court did not refer to
the children as bad, but concluded that limitations on their due pro-
cess rights are justified because the discipline is for their own good.
The Court extended power to the state under the parens patriae
power to justify compulsory education, then found a coextensive
parens patriae power to justify disciplining the children." 3 Neither
the acts of the children nor the children themselves were the focus of
the Court." 4 Instead, the school's need for a quiet work environment
free from disruption, and its need to respond quickly, superseded the
rights of the children.1 5 Not even procedural protection in the form
of a prepunishment hearing was required." 6
Describing the class as children, the majority emphasized their
wayward nature."17 In this way, the class was distinguished from
juveniles, whose acts were the focus of punishment. 1 8 In contrast, the
dissent focused on punishment and the act involved. The dissent char-
acterized the issue as "whether spankings inflicted on public school-
children for breaking school rules is 'punishment.""' 9 In focusing on
the acts, and determining that the consequence was punishment for
"classroom misconduct," the dissent created an image consistent with
the bad juvenile, and would have required a prepunishment hearing to
ensure that procedural due process concerns were addressed. 20 The
dissent noted that the punishment was:
an institutionalized response to the violation of some official
rule or regulation proscribing certain conduct and is imposed for
the purpose of rehabilitating the offender, deterring the offender
and others like him from committing the violation in the future,
112. Id. at 656, 676-77.
113. Id. at 676-80.
114. Id. at 662. The Court noted that the authority to exert corporal punishment does
not derive from the parents, but rested with compulsory education laws that allow the state
to "impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary 'for the proper education
of the child and for the maintenance of group discipline."' Id. (quoting 1 FOWLER V.
HARPER & FLEMNGO JAMES JR., LAW OF TORTS § 3.20, at 292 (1956) (footnote omitted)).
115. Id. at 681-82.
116. Id. at 682. Professor Irene Rosenberg notes that this is simply a reinforcement of
the traditional adult-child authoritarian relationship aimed at the incorporation of children
into conduct traditionally accepted by society. To reach this goal, if there is a dispute about
the power of the parent and the state (as there was in this case), the power will go to the
party that upholds the more traditional values. Irene M. Rosenberg, The Constitutional
Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27
UCLA L. REv. 656, 697-98 (1980).
117. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 659.
118. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
119. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 685 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 684.
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and inflicting some measure of social retribution for the harm
that has been done.' 2'
In this manner, the dissent framed the issue as one involving "offend-
ers" entitled to due process protection, focusing on punishment for
their conduct and retribution by society, instead of on their particular
vulnerabilities as children in need of protection from harm. 22
Ingraham highlights the linguistic images used by proponents and
opponents of children's rights. The parens patriae position used by
the state limited the rights of children by articulating a protective
function that trumped the due process protection claimed by the
class."-3 Unfortunately, as a result, these children exist as objects and
not individuals. The next section illustrates that, even in juvenile
court, good children have limitations placed on their due process
rights.
4. Juvenile Court: Acknowledged but Limited Rights
The children in the juvenile court proceedings of Schall v. Mar-
tin"'24 and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania-5 were denied rights to pretrial
detention hearings and jury trials. Characterizing the parties as "chil-
dren," and minimizing their culpability for the specific acts involved,
the Court in both of these cases acknowledged a general need for due
process protection, but refused to extend that right to children.
These cases further illustrate when children have allegedly en-
gaged in criminal conduct, and are in juvenile proceedings that tradi-
tionally have required due process rights, they are characterized as
good children, with the result that the Court limits their constitutional
rights. These "children," unlike the "juveniles" discussed previously,
have a vulnerability that is deemed to outweigh their maturity and
justifies limiting their due process rights.
In Schall v. Martin, the Supreme Court acknowledged the appli-
cability of the Due Process Clause to juvenile proceedings,- 6 but
stated that it did not apply to juveniles, as juveniles are "always in
some form of custody.""-27 In framing the issue as a method for the
121. Id. at 685-86 (emphasis added).
122. Contra Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); see infra notes 178-186 and accompany-
ing text.
123. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 680-82.
124. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
125. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
126. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263.
127. Id. at 265 (citing Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 510-
11 (1982) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967)).
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state to protect the children from their own future conduct,2 s the
Court supported this paternalistic view by citing cases that character-
ized the child as incapable of making competent choices without gui-
dance.'2 9 The Court specifically distinguished detention from
punishment 3 ' and found that the state had a legitimate, nonpunish-
ment related purpose for the detention.' 3 ' Because the "child""' 2 was
held in a nonsecure facility, the child was found to have a reduced
claim to liberty.'33 Secure detention was also upheld as part of the
regulatory scheme of the state pursuant to the parens patriae power
and the state's objective in protecting the child."3
The procedural protection afforded under the state statutory
scheme was justified by language that more fervently embraced a de-
scription of the parties as juveniles. 35 Further demonstrating the shift
in language accompanying the grant or denial of due process rights
was the Court's assertion that procedural due process rights exist, and
that the current procedures were sufficient to protect the interests of
"the juvenile."' 36 Although subtle, this shift in language limited good
children's rights and extended bad children's rights. By granting due
process protection, in the form of release from pretrial custody, the
lower court also characterized the class as juveniles. 37 Without as-
sessing the individual ability to exercise due process rights, these
rights were nevertheless granted, as the Court focused on the punitive
nature of the detention and the juvenile's maturity. 38
128. The Court noted that the state has an interest in "protecting a juvenile from the
consequences of his criminal activity.., and from the downward spiral of criminal activity
into which peer pressure may lead the child." Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
129. Id. (citing L.O.W. v. District Court, 623 P.2d 1253, 1258-59 (Colo. 1981), Morris v.
D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 140 (R.I. 1980), and Iddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115
(1982)).
130. Id. at 269.
131. Id. at 271.
132. "The assessment unit places the child in either nonsecure or secure detention.
Nonsecure detention involves an open facility in the community, a sort of 'halfway house,'
without locks, bars, or security officers where the child receives schooling and counseling
and has access to recreational facilities." Id. at 271 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., id. at 275 ("[T]he accused juvenile is given full notice of the charges
against him and a complete stenographic record is kept of the hearing.").
136. Id. at 275-77.
137. See id. at 262. "'[T]he vast majority of juveniles detained under [§ 320.5(3)(b)]
either have their petitions dismitsed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released
after adjudication."' Id. (quoting Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 369 (2d Cir. 1982)).
138. See id. at 262.
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The dissent never characterized members of the class as children,
but instead focused on the punitive aspects of preventive detention. 139
The dissent used the term "child" only when referring to the decisions
of the lower court or of the majority.1 40 By drawing an analogy to
adult punishment, the dissent argued that the liberty interest should
not be abridged in the absence of a "weighty public interest [which] is
substantially advanced by the statute.' 141
The goals advanced by the majority--protecting society at large
and protecting the child from harm--were rejected by the dissent as
insufficient to allow infringement of the liberty interests. 42 The dis-
sent also would have found the procedural protection insufficient be-
cause of the punitive nature of the statute and its application, which
compelled a higher level of constitutional protection than required by
the majority. 43 This approach, however, failed to assess the ability of
the party to exercise the right. In conformity with the bad juvenile
language, this higher standard was supported by the characterization
of the class as juveniles.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' re-
quest for a jury trial in the adjudicative phase of a juvenile court hear-
ing.144 The plaintiff class characterized the proceedings as equivalent
to the adult criminal procedure, which required a jury trial. 45 The
McKeiver Court, however, distinguished the juvenile process from
adult criminal trials by focusing on the "possibility, at least, that the
jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake
the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an
effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate,
informal protective proceeding.' 1 46 By emphasizing a view of juvenile
court as "fed in part by humanitarian compassion for offenders who
were children,"'47 the Court shifted its focus to the paternalistic pur-
poses of the juvenile court.' 48 Unfortunately, this shift ignored the
139. Id. at 290-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140. See, e.g., id. at 284-85, 289.
141. Id. at 291 ("[P]retrial detention of a juvenile pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) gives rise to
injuries comparable to those associated with imprisonment of an adult.").
142. Id. at 293.
143. Id. at 304-06.
144. 403 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1971) (plurality opinion).
145. Ld. at 541-42. The Court had held in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial applied to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment because "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice."
146. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
147. Id. at 545 n.6 (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 550.
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issue of whether the individual can and should be allowed to have a
procedural hearing. Thus, the Court adopted a paternalistic view to
justify a denial in what would otherwise be recognized as a case in-
volving deprivation of liberty.
While the Court noted that the system had failed, 49 the dissent
did not refer to the appellants as children. Neither did it refer to the
humanitarian goals of the juvenile system. Instead, the dissent fo-
cused on the similarities between juvenile proceedings and adult crim-
inal trials, and concluded that the Due Process Clause demands a jury
trial in juvenile cases.'50 Although this reasoning suggested a frame-
work for an independent analysis of due process rights claimed by the
class,' 5 ' the dissent's approach was not fully framed by the individual
rights accorded under the Constitution. Instead, it too was con-
strained by applying the label of bad juveniles to the class, who then
receive social retribution for their acts. Based on this punitive func-
tion, rather than an immediate evaluation of present concerns, the dis-
sent argued that constitutional due process protection must be
extended. 52
Both Schall and McKeiver demonstrated the Court's use of good
children language to avoid the full-fledged constitutional analysis that
is required when children are treated as persons rather than vulnera-
ble parties subject to the protection of the state. The next section de-
scribes the abandonment of this vulnerability approach. The language
and analysis advanced by the Court demonstrates an absence of vul-
nerability. Instead, the cases focused on the acts of the parties in a
manner that characterized them as bad. In this context, due process
rights were afforded. However, the grant of rights was linked to justi-
fying punishment of the juvenile.
B. The Bad Juveniles
In Kent v. United States'53 and In re Gault,'54 the United States
Supreme Court recognized the rights of juveniles who were subject to
149. Id. at 543-44 (stating that "fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court propo-
nents and early reformers of three generations ago have not been realized").
150. Id. at 560 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
151. See id. app. at 563 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (reprint of Rhode Island family court
opinion discussing issues that would be the focus on adult liberty analysis, such as the
trauma faced by juveniles, the effect on judicial backlog, the use of a public trial, and the
jury of peers).
152. Id. at 558.
153. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
154. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
proceedings in juvenile court.155 Noting that the proceedings were not
themselves criminal in nature, but would have been had the parties
been adults,' 56 the Gault Court focused on the actions involved and
not on the vuinerabilities of the parties as children. 1 7 In both cases,
the Court extended rights to juveniles based on the social compact
that exists with all citizens, 58 and rejected less informal proceedings
as an inadequate protection of the parties' rights. 59
The Kent Court found a reflection of criminal proceedings in the
juvenile court,' 60 but ignored an alternative approach that would have
applied in those cases where juveniles' acts make them "bad" in the
eyes of society, or where society sought retribution for the harm. This
latter approach, established in Gault the following year, was the justi-
fication for extending rights without evaluating the child's ability to
exercise them. 6 '
By focusing on the curative purposes of the juvenile court, Justice
Stewart's dissent illustrates language used to invoke paternalistic con-
cern and care and eliminate the need to extend rights. Justice Stewart
noted that:
Whether treating with [sic] a delinquent child, a neglected child,
a defective child, or a dependent child, a juvenile proceeding's
whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission
and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court. The object of
155. Kent required waiver hearings to comport with due process. See Kent, 383 U.S. at
562. Gault provided the additional due process requirements of notice, representation by
counsel, and protection against self-incrimination. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 57-58.
156. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17; see id. at 68 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting the determination of whether juvenile courts are civil or criminal is too im-
precise to decide the application of the Fourteenth Amendment).
157. Id. at 17. The early notion of the juvenile court system was that children needed to
be protected from the formality of procedure and that "society's duty to the child could not
be confined by the concept of justice alone." Id. at 15. The fact that Gault focused on bad
children is demonstrated by its limited application to cases involving criminal offenses. It
has not been held to apply to noncriminal status offenses. Rosenberg, supra note 116, at
662 n.33 (citations omitted).
158. Gault, 387 U.S. at 19-20. The Court indicated that "[d]ue process of law is the
primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential
term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the pow-
ers which the state may exercise." Md (footnote omitted).
159. Itt at 21. The Court rejected the articulated purposes of the juvenile court and the
notion of parens patriae as a justification for the nonapplication of rights. Id. at 17-21;
Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-56.
160. Kent, 383 U.S. at 562. The Court made this clear in Gault, as well, by focusing on
"whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the
consequence that he may be committed to a state institution." Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
161. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 684-86 (White, J., dissenting); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 190-192.
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the one is correction of a condition. The object of the other is
conviction and punishment for a criminal act. 62
He would have limited the application of due process rights to facili-
tate the needs of society in dealing with the child whose parents
"'knew of their right to counsel, to subpoena and cross examine wit-
nesses, of the right to confront the witnesses against Gerald and the
possible consequences of a finding of delinquency."'163 Justice Stew-
art rejected the criminal court parallel drawn by the majority, and em-
phasized the parental power to act in the child's best interest.
The good children language often leads to a limitation of rights,
while the utilization of the bad juveniles language signals a shift which
provides rights as well as punishment.164 Contemporaneously, the
analysis was focused on the acts of the offenders. The following sec-
tions highlight the characterization of "bad juveniles" as mature-a
maturity invoked by the Court to justify an extension of constitutional
rights, based in part on the execution of punishment, without refer-
ence to the social compact which initially framed the rights in Gault.161
1. Double Jeopardy
In Breed v. Jones, the juvenile court initially found that the de-
fendant had violated a criminal statute.166 In a unanimous decision,
the Supreme Court granted due process rights to juveniles by holding
that the prosecution of the defendant as an adult in a California supe-
rior court triggered the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.167
The defendant was defined by the Court as a juvenile. This use of
the term juvenile allowed the Court to rely on the precedents of Gault
and Winship in determining that the juvenile court proceeding was, in
fact, a criminal proceeding, which justified the extension of due pro-
cess rights. Drawing on the defendant's actions, rather than on vul-
nerabilities that might be corrected by an adjudication and treatment
plan implemented in the juvenile court, the Court's discussion focused
on the harm allegedly done by the defendant. 68 The transfer of the
case to an adult court was also influenced by the lower court's conclu-
162. Gault, 387 U.S. at 78-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 81 (quoting In re Gault, 407 P.2d 760,763 (Ariz. 1965), rev'd, 387 U.S. at 21).
164. See Duncan, supra note 44, at 788-92.
165. See supra note 158 (discussing social compact).
166. 421 U.S. 519, 520 (1975).
167. Id. at 528-41.
168. Id. at 524 n.6.
sion that the defendant was "unfit for treatment as a juvenile."' 69 The
lower court opinion revealed little concern about the background or
social needs of the child, and simply ordered him to be prosecuted as
an adult.' 70
With the foregoing conclusion, the Supreme Court effectively de-
clared that, since the rehabilitative aspects of the juvenile court would
not assist the accused, no further individualized determination of his
needs must occur.171 At the same time, recasting the accused as a
juvenile formalized the conclusion that he also lacked the vulnerable
characteristics of a good child, and thus eliminated the need for the
juvenile court to retain jurisdiction or exercise the goals of the parens
patriae power. Seeing this as an application of adult punishment, the
Court made "applicable in [the] juvenile proceedings constitutional
guarantees associated with traditional criminal prosecutions."'1 72 In
effect, the Court was saying that, because punishment will be ex-
acted,173 an application of due process is required.
The contrast between this case and those in the previous section
stands as a striking reminder of the disparity in treatment that results
when the notion of vulnerability of children is eliminated and they are
instead characterized as juveniles. The following cases yield further
examples of the bad juvenile image resulting in exacting punishment.
2. The Suspension Case: Due Process Goes to School
In Goss v. Lopez, the majority granted procedural due process
rights, in the form of pre- or post-suspension hearing procedures, to
children suspended from school.174 The term "child" was used only
once in the majority opinion. 75 At all other times, members of the
class were referred to either by name or as students who were en-
169. See id at 524 (citation omitted).
170. See id.
171. This punishment is based on social retribution. See supra notes 46-48.
172. Breed, 421 U.S. at 528-29 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) and In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
173. "As we have observed, the risk to which the term jeopardy refers is that tradition-
ally associated with 'actions intended to authorize criminal punishment to vindicate public
justice."' Id. at 529. (quoting United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49
(1943)).
174. 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
175. "[T]he total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period,
and certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended
child." Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
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gaged in "misconduct."'1 76 The Court focused not on the school's need
to maintain discipline, as in Ingraham ,177 but on the punishment im-
posed-suspension from school-and acts of the student that invited
it. Treating the suspension as a form of punishment, a conclusion sup-
ported by punitive language in the record,178 the majority determined
that constitutional due process was unquestionably applicable. 179
The dissent demonstrated the other side of the dichotomy, by us-
ing the terms "child" and "children" much more frequently, and ana-
lyzed the issue as one involving the right of schools to exercise control
and discipline' 80 over them.' 8 ' Pointing to precedent that distin-
guished and diminished the rights of children from those extended to
adults,' ' the dissent applied the individual liberty interest of the chil-
dren on the grounds that the rights of children are not "coextensive
with those of adults."' 8 3
The dissent's attempt to justify the constitutional limitation,
based on the immaturity of the children, is another example of opin-
ions that characterize children as vulnerable. 184 Because the dissent
perceived the teacher-pupil relationship as one in which the teacher
takes on the role of parent-substitute, 185 the parental authority was
used to limit due process rights. The class in this case can be analo-
gized to the "children" in need of corporal punishment in Ingraham v.
Wright.'86
176. Because the seriousness of the misconduct charges, if sustained and recorded,
could seriously damage the students' reputation, as well as interfere with later educational
and employment opportunities, the Court required due process. Id. at 574-75.
177. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
178. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-75.
179. At.
180. The dissent lamented what it perceived as a shift in power from the school to the
courts, noting: "The Court holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather than edu-
cational officials and state legislatures, have the authority to determine the rules applicable
to routine classroom discipline of children and teenagers in the public schools." Id. at 585
(Powell, J., dissenting).
181. "I would conclude that a deprivation of not more than 10 days' suspension from
school, imposed as a routine disciplinary measure, does not assume constitutional dimen-
sions." Id. at 587.
182. "Moreover, the Court ignores the experience of mankind, as well as the long his-
tory of our law, recognizing that there are differences which must be accommodated in
determining the rights and duties of children as compared with those of adults." Id. at 590-
91.
183. Id. at 591 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stew-
art, J., concurring)).
184. "When an immature student merits censure for his conduct, he is rendered a dis-
service if appropriate sanctions are not applied .... " Id. at 593.
185. Id. at 594 (citation omitted).
186. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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3. Self-Incrimination-the Fifth Amendment Case
In Fare v. Michael C., the Court granted Fifth Amendment rights
to the defendant, but found that he knowingly waived the right to re-
main silent.187 The majority referred to this defendant as "the ac-
cused" or as "a juvenile,"' 8  reinforcing the bad juvenile
characterization. The majority cites to the lower court's description of
a "'16 and a half year old minor who has been through the court sys-
tem before, has been to [probation] camp, has a probation officer,
[and is not] a young, naive minor with no experience with the
courts, ' ' 89 a passage which evokes little concern about the welfare of
a vulnerable child.
In Fare, the defendant failed to recognize the constitutional dis-
tinction between requesting to speak with his parole officer and re-
questing to speak with an attorney, 90 a nuance which, according to
the majority, the accused was bound to recognize in the formal dis-
tinction in function between an attorney and a parole officer. 9' This
reasoning precluded Michael's attempt to invoke his right to silence
when he asked for his parole officer instead of an attorney.192
However, the constitutional analysis did not end with the grant of
the right. The Court went on to apply a totality-of-the-circumstances
test to determine the defendant's ability to knowingly waive the
right.' 93 The California Supreme Court had invoked a per se rule with
regard to Miranda, and did not address the totality of the circum-
187. 442 U.S. 707, 725-26 (1979) (5-4) (holding request to speak to probation officer
during police interrogation not a per se Miranda violation).
188. In the case, the term "juvenile" is used over 50 times, and "accused" is used over
25 times. Id. at passim.
189. Id. at 713.
190. The Fare opinion, however, is more troubling for another reason. Implicit in
the majority opinion is an assumption that Michael C., the juvenile in this case,
was mature enough to understand that he was waiving his Miranda rights by re-
questing to talk to his probation officer. This assumption suggests that juveniles
are somehow similar to adults for purposes of Fifth Amendment protection; an
assumption that illustrates the remarkable change in the Court's attitude toward
children from that found in Gallegos and Haley, the early police interrogation
cases in which the Court was solicitous of the special status of children.
Dale, Children Before the Supreme Court, supra note 56, at 536.
191. Fare, 442 U.S. at 723.
192. Id. ("The State cannot transmute the relationship between probation officer and
juvenile offender into the type of relationship between attorney and client that was essen-
tial to the holding of Miranda simply by legislating an amorphous 'duty to advise and care
for the juvenile defendant."') (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 579 P.2d 7, 10 (Cal. 1978), rev'd,
442 U.S. at 725-26).
193. Id. at 725.
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stances regarding waiver.194 By characterizing Michael as a bad juve-
nile, the Court also presumed his competence to waive the right. The
Court imposed standards of knowledge that comported with his pre-
sumed maturity, noting-as it would in the case of an adult defend-
ant-that "[tlhere is no indication that he was of insufficient
intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the con-
sequences of that waiver would be. He was not worn down by im-
proper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or
deceit." 95 This analysis contrasts with that of the lower court and of
the dissent. The latter two instances focused on the rehabilitative
function of the juvenile court system and on the function of the parole
officer. The lower court found that the officer was "'a trusted guard-
ian figure who exercises the authority of the state as parens patriae
and whose duty it was to implement the protective and rehabilitative
powers of the juvenile court,"" 96 which supported a categorization of
the defendant as a vulnerable child-or at least as one in need of the
rehabilitative functions of the juvenile court system. Further, accord-
ing to Justice Marshall's dissent, the defendant was entitled to addi-
tional assistance by virtue of his immaturity.197
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Powell, the defendant was re-
ferred to as a "young person, 16 years old at the time of his arrest and
the subsequent prolonged interrogation at the station house." 98 Ac-
cording to Justice Powell, "he was immature, emotional, and unedu-
cated, and therefore was likely to be vulnerable to the skillful, two-on-
one, repetitive style of interrogation to which he was subjected."' 99
Reflecting the good-child prong of the dichotomy, his decision ad-
194. The totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry was rejected, with the court stating:
Here, however, we face conduct which, regardless of considerations of capacity,
coercion or voluntariness, per se invokes the privilege against self-incrimination.
Thus our question turns not on whether the [respondent] had the ability, capacity
or willingness to give a knowledgeable waiver, and hence whether he acted volun-
tarily, but whether, when he called for his probation officer, he exercised his Fifth
Amendment privilege. We hold that in doing so he no less invoked the protection
against self-incrimination than if he asked for the presence of an attorney.
Michael C., 579 P.2d at 10-11, quoted in Michael C., 442 U.S. at 707.
195. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 726-27.
196. Id. at 713-14 (quoting Michael C., 579 P.2d at 10).
197. Id. at 730 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing with approval the determination of the
lower court that "[t]he juvenile defendant, in the Court's view, required 'the aid of more
mature judgment as to the steps he should take in the predicament in which he found
himself. A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the protec-
tion which his own immaturity could not."') (quoting Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54
(1982)).
198. Id. at 733 (Powell, J., dissenting).
199. Appellant's Brief at 54-82, cited in Michael C., 442 U.S. at 733.
vanced the argument that this defendant did not have the ability to
knowingly waive Miranda rights.
Although the majority used the bad juvenile image and granted
rights, there was a void in the independent analysis about the circum-
stances of the individual. The case in the next section reveals that the
use of both characterizations has significant consequences for the class
in which minors are too vulnerable to be released and yet sufficiently
mature to affirmatively request procedural due process. The effect of
these disparate characterizations is the loss of constitutional
protections.
I. Reno v. Flores
A. Facts and Procedural Background
In Reno v. Flores,200 the plaintiffs were unaccompanied, undocu-
mented minor children, detained by INS officials in one of three West-
ern Region sites: Los Angeles, San Diego, or El Centro.2 10 Once
detained, deportation proceedings were initiated,20 2 and without any
articulated suspicion, they were routinely strip searched for weapons
and contraband.20 3 The plaintiffs challenged this action as a Fourth
Amendment violation, 2° and the district court enjoined the searches
as unconstitutional.2"' Despite this victory, the children remained in
the indefinite custody of the INS. Under a Western Region policy
adopted in 1984, unaccompanied minors in deportation proceedings
were detained without bail unless they were claimed by a parent or
legal guardian.20 6 This treatment in deportation cases contrasted
sharply with exclusion proceedings20 7 and deportation proceedings
200. 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
201. See Alkas, supra note 11, at 367; Kathleen M. Keith, Comment, Deportation Pro-
ceedings-Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Alien Minors In Deportation Proceedings,
Flores v. Meese, 906 F.2d 396, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 316, 316 n.4 (1991).
202. Exclusion proceedings, which are not at issue in the present case, involve aliens
apprehended before "entering" the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1994). Deportation
proceedings apply once entry has been accomplished. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 1995).
203. See Linda R. Coffey, Note, Detention of Juvenile Aliens, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L.J. 292, 293 (1992).
204. Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 669 (C.D. Cal. 1988), rev', 934 F.2d 991 (9th
Cir. 1989), rev'd, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (en bane), rev'd sub nor. Reno v. Flores,
113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
205. Flores, 681 F. Supp. at 669.
206. 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1996); Alkas, supra note 11, at 375 (noting adoption of new
regulations regarding release of deportable minors); Richard A. Karoly, Note, Flores v.
Meese: INS' Blanket Detention of Minors Invalidated, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 183,
184 (1992).
207. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(2)(ii) (1995).
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conducted outside the Western Region, where minors were not only
released to parents and guardians but to other responsible parties as
well.2 ° The minors in Reno v. Flores filed an action against the INS
challenging the policy on equal protection grounds.20 9 According to
the court, the INS failed to rationally justify broader release in exclu-
sion proceedings than in deportation proceedings.210 The court up-
held the challenge and enjoined enforcement of the indeterminate
detention in deportation proceedings. 21' In addition, the court re-
quired a procedural hearing to determine whether the plaintiffs
should be released to a nonparent.212 The INS responded in 1988 by
applying the restrictive rule nationwide to both deportation and exclu-
sion proceedings.21 3 The plaintiffs went back to court and once again
the district court enjoined the policy, this time on grounds that it de-
prived the respondent class of its liberty without procedural due
process. 214
This holding affirmed substantive due process rights and found a
fundamental right to liberty from physical restraint that cannot be in-
fringed if a responsible party is able to take custody and assure the
208. This was consistent with the language found in the Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 504, 88 Stat. 1109, 1135 (1974). The
Western Region, like other INS regions in the United States, adopted the procedure, which
authorizes the release of a juvenile charged with an offense:
to his parents, guardian, custodian, or other responsible party (including, but not
limited to, the director of a shelter-care facility) upon their promise to bring such
juvenile before the appropriate court when requested by such court unless the
magistrate determines, after hearing, at which the juvenile is represented by coun-
sel, that the detention of such juvenile is required to secure his timely appearance
before the appropriate court or to insure his safety or that of others.
18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1994) (emphasis added).
209. Flores, 934 F.2d at 995.
210. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357; Thomas A. Bockhorst, Note, The Constitutionality of INS
Pre-Hearing Detention of Alien Children: Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991),
62 U. CIN. L. REV. 217, 219 (1993).
211. The detention was indeterminate because those who sought full administrative re-
view of asylum applications could remain in detention for years. If relief such as asylum is
granted, then the person who initially entered or attempted entry illegally may become a
citizen. See Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, Toll v. Moreno, and Postsecondary Admis-
sions: Undocumented Adults and "Enduring Disability," 15 J.L. & EDUC. 19, 20 (1986).
212. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357-58.
213. 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1989).
214. See Flores, 934 F.2d at 996. The district court issued an order requiring INS to: (1)
release minors otherwise eligible to their parents, guardian, custodian, conservator, or re-
sponsible party; (2) advise those released promptly in writing of the conditions of their
release; and (3) hold a prompt hearing to determine probable cause for their arrest and the
need for any restrictions to be placed upon their release. See id. at 1014 (Fletcher, C.J.,
dissenting).
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children's appearance at future hearings.215 The court also guaran-
teed procedural due process by requiring an automatic individualized
hearing for each unaccompanied minor to determine probable cause
for detention and to evaluate the reasonableness of release.216
The Ninth Circuit reversed in a two-to-one decision.21 7 In their
petition for rehearing en banc, the plaintiffs argued that the panel ma-
jority erred in failing to recognize a fundamental liberty interest.218 In
rejecting a narrow definition of the rights in question,21 9 the Ninth
Circuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the district court.2"
The en banc majority determined that the detained children had the
fundamental right to be free from physical restraint.221 Since the right
abridged was classified as a fundamental liberty interest, the govern-
mental detention could not stand "unless there is a determination that
such detention furthers a significant governmental interest." 22 The
en banc decision rejected the INS claim of a legitimate interest based
on the welfare of the children.223 According to the majority, the mere
mention of a concern for child welfare could not justify indefinite de-
tention where other less restrictive measures existed.2 4
Citing Mathews v. Diaz,.' the court further noted that even ile-
gal aliens enjoy Fifth Amendment due process protection,2 26 indicat-
ing that the liberty right was not affected by the children's status as
aliens or minors.227 The court found that "[b]ecause the children are
persons present in the United States they must be afforded procedural
protections in conjunction with any deprivation of liberty. '22
215. See id at 1014.
216. See id. In 1987, only 5% of the arrested children asked for a hearing while nearly
85.5% asked for and received voluntary departure. Scharf & Hess, supra note 49, at 115.
217. Flores, 934 F.2d at 1013; see Karoly, supra note 206, at 187-88.
218. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1358.
219. The majority in the panel decision and the dissent in the en banc decision charac-
terized the right at issue as the nonfundamental right to be released to an unrelated third
party adult. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1377 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting); see Bockhorst, supra note
210, at 235.
220. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1365; see also Keith, supra note 11, at 322-27 (summarizing the
action of the lower courts).
221. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1361-62.
222. Id at 1360.
223. Id at 1362-63.
224. Id. at 1361-62; see also Bockhorst, supra note 210, at 233 (arguing for less restric-
tive measures).
225. 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (holding that due process rights apply to aliens).
226. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1354.
227. Id at 1362.
228. Id at 1354 (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77).
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Procedural due process aspects of the district court order, such as
providing for a hearing to determine the terms and conditions of re-
lease, were also upheld as reasonable.22 9 This measure served to
maintain the substantive and procedural due process rights of the
class. The en bane decision was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.230
B. Appeal to the United States Supreme Court
In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit.23' The various opinions of the Court reflect different
extensions of rights, as well as different characterizations of the class.
The following sections demonstrate how the Court's use of language
to create different images of children correlates to a grant or denial of
rights.
1. The Majority Decision
Justice Scalia's dual characterization of the class amounted to a
shift in the language that gave these children "the worst of both
worlds. 2 3 2 With regard to substantive due process issues, Justice
Scalia characterized the class as "children, '233 vulnerable and subject
to the parens patriae power of the INS.234 But in the procedural due
process context, Justice Scalia used the terms "aliens" or "alien
juveniles, 235 signaling a shift in his view of their ability to act on their
own behalf. According to the majority opinion, the plaintiffs were si-
multaneously children who required the government's protection and
mature juveniles who were not denied procedural due process by the
affirmative requirement of having to ask for a hearing.23 6 As
juveniles, the members of the class were judged as being "not... too
young or too ignorant to exercise that right when the form asking
229. Id. at 1364.
230. Barr v. Flores, 503 U.S. 905 (1992) (No. 91-905).
231. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1454.
232. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,556 (1966) (Fortas, J.) (noting that pursuant to
the limitations of the juvenile court, "the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children").
233. See, e.g., Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1448 ("the government does not intend to punish the
child"), 1448 ("whether private placement would be in the child's 'best interest"').
234. This finding is notwithstanding the initial INS position that argued that the policy
was not adopted to protect the welfare of the children, but to prohibit liability claims
against the INS. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Flores, 113 S. Ct at 1450.
236. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(d) (1996).
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them to assert or waive it is presented." 37 The following sections
more clearly demonstrate the shift in language and its due process
significance.
a. The Substantive Due Process Issues
The substantive due process claims arose from the challenge to
section 242.24 of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which
involved a regulation that eliminated the possibility of release from
detention to anyone other than a parent, legal guardian, or adult rela-
tive such as a brother, sister, aunt, uncle, or grandparent. 3 Accord-
ing to the majority, the substantive right did not involve detention as a
form of punishment.239  As Justice Scalia stated, "'Legal custody'
rather than 'detention' more accurately describes the reality of the
arrangement, however, since these are not correctional institutions
but facilities that meet 'state licensing requirements for the provision
of shelter care, foster care, group care, and related services to depen-
dent children.' ' 240 Thus, to the extent that they protect dependent
children, these facilities were categorically different from an institu-
tion which limits freedom.241 To support his conclusion that the facili-
ties were not houses of punishment, Scalia described them as being:
"in an open type of setting without a need for extraordinary se-
curity measures," 24 ... [and they] must provide, in accordance
with "applicable child welfare statutes and generally accepted
child welfare standards, practices, principles and procedures,"
an extensive list of services, including physical care and mainte-
nance, individual and group counseling, education, recreation
237. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1451. In addition, since the majority described the claim as a
facial challenge, it would be denied as long as even one member of the class could exercise
the right. Id. at 1446.
238. IL at 1446; 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(d) (1995). This right existed in other parts of the coun-
try and in nondeportation proceedings prior to 1988. See supra note 208.
239. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1448.
240. Id. at 1445 (quoting Memorandum of Understanding Re: Compromise of Class
Action: Conditions of Detention, Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30,
1987) (No. 85-4544-RJK), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioners at 148a-205a [hereinaf-
ter Juvenile Care Agreement]).
241. Compare this with the position of Justices O'Connor and Stevens, see infra text
accompanying notes 270, 283, who note that "recipients are required to design programs
and strategies to discourage runaways and prevent the unauthorized absence of minors in
care." Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1458 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Juvenile Care Agree-
ment, supra note 240, at 173a); see also Alkas, supra note 11, at 367-71 (describing the
conditions of detention as deplorable).
242. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1445 (citing Juvenile Care Agreement supra note 240, at 173a).
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and leisure-time activities, family reunification services, and ac-
cess to religious services, visitors, and legal assistance.24 3
Narrowly characterizing the right in question as an "alleged right
of a child who has no available parent, close relative, or legal guard-
ian, and for whom the government is responsible, to be placed in the
custody of a willing-and-able private custodian rather than of a gov-
ernment-operated or government-selected child-care institution, '2 44
the Court rejected respondents' claim to due process freedom from
physical restraint.24 5 In support of this conclusion, the Court used lan-
guage that described the class as being comprised of vulnerable or
dependent children, who were simply being protected by the INS be-
cause they had "no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian,
[and] where the government does not intend to punish the child, and
where the conditions of governmental custody are decent and hu-
mane, such custody surely does not violate the Constitution. '246
The least restrictive alternative, advanced by the en banc deci-
sion,2 47 was also rejected by the majority because "institutional cus-
tody (despite the availability of responsible private custodians) is not
unconstitutional in itself, [and therefore] it does not become so simply
because it is shown to be less desirable than some other arrangement
for the particular child. '248 The Court's claim that there is a major
difference between "the best interests of the child '249 and the "wel-
fare of the child,"" is simply another example of the distinction be-
tween "good children" whose "best interests" must be determined,
and "bad juveniles" whose welfare must be balanced against the
safety of the community. The "best interest" criterion is not "the sole
constitutional criterion.., where their interests conflict in varying de-
grees with the interests of others";251 rather, the parental and state
authority counter balances the claims.
243. Id. (citing Juvenile Care Agreement, supra note 240, at 159a, 178a-185a). Contra
Olivas, supra note 11, at 160; Alkas, supra note 11, at 371.
244. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1447.
245. Id.
246. IL at 1448. Contra Timothy L. Raschke Shattuck, Note, Justice Scalia's Due Pro-
cess Methodology: Examining Specific Traditions, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2743, 2746-53 (1992)
(establishing a framework for analyzing Justice Scalia's due process cases). Based upon the
articulated approach, the Court's decision in Flores is contrary to traditional notions of
liberty. The right to be free from physical restraint is a well-established right that should
not be abandoned, unless Justice Scalia is influenced by some other unspoken policy.
247. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.




The substantive due process analysis was shaped by the charac-
terization of the class as children, which allowed the INS to raise the
parens patriae power as a justification for refusing to release a child to
an unrelated adult 2 and adversely affect the children's constitutional
rights by revitalizing their interest in freedom. This approach also
failed to account for the parents' rationale in not coming forward and
its impact on the children.?53 Deferring to the INS also eliminated the
need to evaluate the unique and complex reality of the children-the
very reality which might have explained conflicts of interest between
the children and INS.' 4 A better solution would have been to ana-
lyze the ability of the children to participate in determining the
outcome.
Finally, the Court did not indicate why release to an unrelated
adult violated standards of care for minors since the Department of
Justice Juvenile Justice Standards allowed for such a release in nonim-
migration settings.2 55 The Court's deference to the protective func-
tion of the INS in this context was apparently misplaced.
252. Ironically, a review of the early parens patriae cases would have allowed release to
the adults seeking the children in the Flores case. As noted by Professor Rendleman, "The
members of 'any duly organized or incorporated humane society having for one of its ob-
jects the protection of children from cruelty' were allowed to become guardians of the
child." Rendleman, supra note 6, at 227. The failure to acknowledge the right is the
equivalent of punishing the children to coerce the parents into the action of coming for-
ward. See Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of Undocu-
mented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 35, 37 (1988); Note, The Birthright Citizenship
Amendment: A Threat to Equality, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1026, 1031 (1994).
253. The plaintiffs asserted that the change in policy was a ruse to apprehend the adult.
Accord Olivas, supra note 11, at 160 (noting one of the purposes of the detention is to use
the children as "bait" to catch the other members of the family). Jenny Flores's mother
failed to seek custody because she feared deportation proceedings would be initiated
against her. Beth S. Rose, Comment, INS Detention of Alien Minors: The Flores Chal-
lenge, 1 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 329, 331 (1986); see also Gail Q. Goeke, Note, Substantive and
Procedural Due Process for Unaccompanied Alien Juveniles, 60 Mo. L. REv. 221, 223
(1995).
254. See Bockhorst, supra note 210, at 242 ("The parens patriae doctrine is laden with
fundamental contradictions. It assumes that the state will act in the best interests of the
child, when in fact the interests of the child may conflict with the interests of the state.")
(citing Claudia Worrell, Note, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection
Masked by the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 174, 175, 181-82 (1985)); Olivas, supra
note 11, at 160 (arguing pressure brought to bear on the children is in an attempt to have
them waive their rights to immigration hearings); Alkas, supra note 11, at 379 (noting coer-
cive practices adopted by the INS to entice unaccompanied minors into conceding de-
portability and waiving rights).
255. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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b. The Procedural Due Process Issues
When the issue was one of procedural due process, the respon-
dent class was no longer referred to as children. Fifth Amendment
rights were acknowledged.156 but whether procedural due process ex-
isted was determined by "review[ing] in some detail the procedures
the INS has employed" with regard to "alien juveniles." 7 In this
context, the class was now recast as juveniles who were granted proce-
dural due process rights. In their particular circumstances, however,
the result was a furtherance of detention.258
The Court, focusing on an arrest by an INS officer followed by an
opportunity to voluntarily depart the country,2 59 noted that before
voluntary departure, detained juveniles "must in fact communicate
with either a parent, adult relative, friend, or with an organization
found on the free legal services list. ' 260 These juveniles were subse-
quently taken before an INS officer, who determined whether there
was sufficient evidence to initiate deportation proceedings.2 61 Based
on this determination, an order to show cause, containing a form enti-
tled "Notice of Custody Determination," was issued,2 62 thereby noti-
fying the individual that he or she must affirmatively request a custody
determination hearing.263
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that "due process is
satisfied by giving the detained alien juveniles the right to [request] a
hearing before an immigration judge. It has not been shown that all
of them are too young or too ignorant to exercise that right when the
form asking them to assert or waive it is presented."2" In the absence
of such evidence, the Court presumed that "juvenile aliens" are ma-
ture enough to competently exercise that right. The image of the class
256. See, e.g., Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1449.
257. Id.
258. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-27 (1979) (analyzing the application
within the dichotomy); Scharf & Hess, supra note 49, at 115 (noting 85.3% of the unaccom-
panied minors apprehended by the INS in July-September 1987 voluntarily returned to
their home country, while only 5% asked for a hearing) (footnote omitted), 123-26 (noting
that children are unable to knowingly waive Miranda warnings, and therefore unaccompa-
nied minors are incapable of exercising the request for a hearing); see supra note 190 and
accompanying text.
259. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1994); Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1449-50; 8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1996).
260. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1450; see 8 C.F.R. § 242.24(g) (1996).
261. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1996).
262. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1450 (citing Form 1-221S, reprinted in App. to Brief for Peti-
tioner at 7a-8a).
263. Id. ("The alien must check either a box stating 'I do' or a box stating '[I] do not
request a redetermination by an Immigration Judge of the custody decision' . . .
264. Id at 1450-51.
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as juveniles was further supported by equating this proceeding with
criminal cases, in which the Court "held that juveniles are capable of
'knowingly and intelligently' waiving their right against self-incrimina-
tion."26 Unlike vulnerable good children in need of protection, these
alien juveniles were deemed to possess the ability to determine what
would be in their own best interest.266
The bad juvenile image in the analysis resulted in a denial of a
right to an automatic hearing, based on the characterization of the
class as competent and able to choose action that is in their best inter-
est. This is very different from the characterization of their vulnerabil-
ity in the substantive due process context.267 As an approach, it failed
to evaluate the complex concerns of the individual members of the
class. 268 Granting them rights without determining their ability to ex-
ercise them undercuts those rights and allows the INS to continue
their detention.2 69 The following section illustrates how the concur-
rence used a different characterization to limit both substantive and
procedural due process rights.
2. The Concurring Opinion
Unconsciously reinforcing the themes of the good child-bad ju-
venile dichotomy, Justice O'Connor wrote separately to clarify that
"these children have a constitutionally protected interest in freedom
from institutional confinement. That interest lies within the core of
265. Id. (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 770,724-27 (1979)); see also United States v.
Saucedo-Velasquez, 843 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying Fare to alien juvenile).
266. This is contrary to the weight of evidence, which demonstrates that children who
are victims of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder are incapable of exercising their rights know-
ingly. See supra note 11. Further, these children are even more disadvantaged, and inca-
pable of making the choice, since they are unfamiliar with the rights and processes which
they are asked to evaluate.
Because a majority of American juveniles cannot make a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver of their Miranda rights, it is inconceivable that foreign chil-
dren, not only suffering the difficulties of youth, but also unfamiliar with both the
American judicial process and the English language, can make a knowing and
intelligent waiver of similar legal rights.
Scharf & Hess, supra note 49, at 126-27 (footnote omitted).
267. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
268. Many of these children are victims of severe systemic abuse. They have fled their
countries in search of safety and freedom, escaping from trauma which may adversely af-
fect their ability to act in their own best interest. Alkas, supra note 11, at 371; see also
Scharf & Hess, supra note 49, at 123 (citing psychological data supporting the inability of
detained children to voluntarily and knowingly waive legal rights).
269. See Scharf & Hess, supra note 49, at 122 (noting a waiver of rights may not be
made "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly, [and] are [therefore] ineffective [and ef-
fect] a de facto deprivation ... of constitutional rights") (quoting Perez-Funez v. INS, 611
F. Supp. 990, 1002-03 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).
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the Due Process Clause." 7° Nevertheless, finding a core liberty inter-
est does not end the analysis since, where children are concerned, the
liberty interest was "subject to the control of their parents, and if pa-
rental control falters, the [s]tate must play its part as parens pa-
triae."' Despite a heightened scrutiny analysis, the parental
protection interest asserted by the INS was sufficient to meet the
standard.
In cases involving adults, the articulated interest was "usually a
punitive interest in imprisoning the convicted criminal or a regulatory
interest in forestalling danger to the community."27 In this case, how-
ever, the determination of custody was made by the Service:
Where a juvenile has no available parent, close relative, or legal
guardian, where the government does not intend to punish the
child, and where the conditions of governmental custody are de-
cent and humane [and therefore], such custody surely does not
violate the Constitution. It is rationally connected to a govern-
mental interest in "preserving and promoting the welfare of the
child." 274
Furthermore, it is important to the analysis that the custody was for
the "welfare of the minors" and not for a punitive purpose.275 This
approach clearly articulated the good child language, which acknowl-
edged due process rights, but then limited them by relying on a supe-
rior parens patriae purpose.
The dissent would also have found that a fundamental liberty in-
terest existed, challenged the rationale advanced by the INS, and ar-
gued that the fights were triggered because the minors were subject to
punishment. The next section examines the outcome when the chil-
dren are categorized differently.
3. The Dissent
a. The Substantive Due Process Issues
Countering the majority's description of the detention as cus-
tody,276 Justice Stevens stated that "[t]he fight at stake in this case is
not the right of detained juveniles to be released to one particular cus-
270. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1454 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
271. Id. at 1455 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)).
272. Id. at 1456.
273. Id. at 1454 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,748 (1987) and Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81-82 (1992)).
274. Id. at 1456 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
275. Id.
276. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. Alternatively, Justice Stevens found:
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todian rather than another, but the right not to be detained in the first
place."277 He described the class as being composed of "juveniles who
pose no risk of flight, and no threat of harm to themselves or to
others. '2 78 Justice Stevens declared the existence of a core liberty in-
terest-"the right to be free from government confinement[, which] is
the very essence of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause."2 79 Upon finding a fundamental liberty interest, the dissent
searched for a compelling state interest. 0 The dissent found the ra-
tionale of the INS not to be compelling:
This case is not about the permanent settlement of alien chil-
dren, or the establishment of permanent legal custody over alien
children. It is about the temporary detention of children that
come into federal custody, which is precisely the focus of section
504 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974.281
The thrust of the Act and Justice Stevens's position was that the con-
finement in question is punishment of juveniles who are entitled to
substantive due process protection.
b. The Procedural Due Process Issues
Justice Stevens also found that section 242(a) required greater
procedural due process protection than the majority required. He ar-
gued for an individualized determination for each child to determine
whether detention was necessary when a child does not have an au-
thorized custodian. 282 Justice Stevens would have held that detention
"on the basis of a general presumption as to the [suitability] of [partic-
ular] custodians without an individualized [determination] as to
whether that presumption" ought to apply in a particular case is an
It makes little difference that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of
custody, for detention in an institution pursuant to the regulation is vastly differ-
ent from release to a responsible person .... In many ways the difference is
comparable to the difference between imprisonment and probation or parole.
Both conditions can be described as "legal custody," but the constitutional dimen-
sions of individual "liberty" identify the great divide that separates the two.
Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1458 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
482 (1972)).
277. Id. at 1468.
278. Id, at 1457-58 (emphasis added).
279. Id. at 1470.
280. Id. at 1468.
281. Id. at 1465 n.24.
282. Id. at 1467. He also noted that the children in question "are children who have
responsible third parties available to receive and care for them; many, perhaps most, of
them will never be deported." Id. at 1458 (footnote omitted).
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infringement on a child's freedom from bodily restraint.283 Without
such an individual hearing, children without INS-approved custodians
could remain detained indefinitely.28 4 But "[i]f the government is go-
ing to detain juveniles in order to protect their welfare, due process
requires that it demonstrate, on an individual basis, that detention in
fact serves that interest.1285
This conclusion was supported by the inconsistency of the INS
policy with congressional preference for release of juveniles, as estab-
lished in section 5034 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion Act.286 Under the Act, juveniles were not to be detained when
there was a "responsible party" 287 willing and able to assume care for
them. The INS, however, justified its policy by advancing the notion
that it served "the best interest of the child. '288 Justice Stevens ar-
gued that, by dismissing the intent behind section 504, the INS must
contend that Congress was granting the Attorney General the discre-
tion to treat alien minors better than American juveniles.28 9
The dissent's discussion of the limitation demonstrated an
acknow-ledgement of the vulnerable nature of children that requires
an automatic hearing to ensure access to the legal system.2 90 This ap-
proach echoed the good children language, portraying the class as
children who were dependent on others for full implementation of
their constitutional rights.
The final aspect involving procedural due process was whether
the right existed in a meaningful way if the class members must have
affirmatively requested a hearing. The majority held that, insofar as a
facial challenge is concerned, due process was satisfied by giving the
detained alien juvenile the right to a hearing before a judge.29' In
283. Id. at 1467.
284. See Flores, 942 F.2d at 1361-62.
285. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1469 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
286. See S. Rep. No. 93-1011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 204, at 56 (1974).
287. 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1994).
288. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1448.
289. Id. at 1465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
290. It also affirms the research that indicates that the vulnerable nature of the children
affects their ability to effectuate procedural due process. See Scharf & Hess, supra note 49,
at 123-27 (summarizing research that demonstrates limitation on the ability to exercise
waivers).
291. Contra supra note 20. As Judge Rymer pointed out in her separate opinion in the
Court of Appeals:
Unlike the statutes at issue in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), and [United
States v.] Salerno, [481 U.S. 739 (1987),] which survived due process challenges,
the INS regulations provide no opportunity for the reasoned consideration of an
alien juvenile's release to the custody of a nonrelative by a neutral hearing officer.
Nor is there any provision for a prompt hearing on a § 242.24(b)(4) release. No
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addition, the majority noted that there was no evidence showing that
the children were incapable of exercising that right.2' The majority
justified this assertion by indicating that most of the children were
sixteen or seventeen years of age and were in contact with responsible
third parties to assist them.293 The result of this conclusion is that the
detention without a hearing will continue unless the child affirma-
tively requests a hearing, an unlikely situation since the children in
question have a "troubled background and lack of familiarity with so-
ciety and our culture, [which] give them particularized needs not com-
monly shared by domestic juveniles. 294 Members of the class may
suffer from post traumatic stress295 and be unfamiliar with the United
States legal system. They often speak a different language and are
pressured into waiving rights.296 Under such circumstances, the mere
extension of an opportunity to request a hearing is entirely inadequate
to ensure constitutional protection.
Neither approach used in Flores fully takes into account the per-
sonal liberty interests of the class members.297 To remedy this omis-
sion, the final section of this Article advances an argument for a case-
findings or reasons are required. Nothing in the regulations provides the unac-
companied detainee any help, whether from counsel, a parent or guardian, or
anyone else. Similarly, the regulation makes no provision for appointing a guard-
ian if no family member or legal guardian comes forward. There is no analogue
to a pretrial services report, however cursory. While the INS argues that it lacks
resources to conduct home studies, there is no substantial indication that some
investigation or opportunity for independent, albeit informal consideration of the
juvenile's circumstances in relation to the adult's agreement to care for her is
impractical or financially or administratively infeasible. Although not entirely
clear where the burden of proof resides, it has not clearly been imposed on the
government. And there is no limit on when the deportation hearing must be held,
or put another way, how long the minor may be detained. In short, there is no
ordered structure for resolving custodial status when no relative steps up to the
plate but an unrelated adult is able and willing to do so.
Flores, 942 F.2d at 1374-75 (Rymer, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (foot-
notes omitted).
292. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1450-51.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4-6).
295. See supra note 11.
296. Olivas, supra note 11, at 160; Alkas, supra note 11, at 379 (citing Perez-Funez v.
District Director, 619 F. Supp. 656 (C.D. Cal. 1985), where the INS admitted to using
threats to coerce unaccompanied minors to concede to deportation); Dirk Johnson, Choice
for Young Illegal Aliens: Long Detentions or Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1992, at
Al.
297. The United Nations Treaty on the Rights of Children requires rights that the
United States Supreme Court fails to accord:
State parties shall ensure that:
(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily.
The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the
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by-case liberty interest evaluation, which includes considering the
ability and desire of the parties as part of the determination of when
due process should apply.
IV. Individually Assessed Liberty Interests
When a society recognizes the personhood of its smallest and
most vulnerable members and not only protects them but does
so in a manner that promotes their dignity, it sets a tone condu-
cive to promote democratic ideals. When such conditions are
not present, the message is clear that raw power is more impor-
tant than either reason or caring.2 98
To ensure the constitutional protection of a child's personhood,
the Court should recognize and then move away from the use of cate-
gories such as good children and bad juveniles. The constitutional in-
terests at stake demand nothing less. Too often, however, the Court
evaluates the rights of vulnerable youth by deferring to the interests of
the parents or the state.299 Language that substitutes a paternalistic
approach for a punitive goal-by denying rights to good children and
granting rights to bad juveniles without evaluating the individual abil-
ity of the children-adversely affects due process rights.
As seen in the Flores case, the result is a denial of substantive and
procedural due process. The characterization of the INS action, as
within the parens patriae concerns, effectively eliminated the need for
a heightened constitutional scrutiny of the challenged regulation. The
scrutiny that would otherwise apply is eliminated by the characteriza-
tion of the class as vulnerable children whose best interest is served by
law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appro-
priate period of time;
(c) ... In particular every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from
adults unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do so and shall have
the right to maintain contact with his or her family through correspondence and
visits, save in exceptional circumstances;
(d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt
access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge
the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other compe-
tent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any such
action.
THi UNITEr NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD art. 37, at 13 (Sharon
Detrick ed., 1992).
298. Gary B. Melton, Is There a Place for Children in the New World Order?, 7 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 491, 531 (1993).
299. See Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation-The Proper
Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcS & PUB. POL'Y 423,
436-40 (1993); Francis B. McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of
Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REv. 975, 977-78 (1988); Hillary Rodham, Children Under the
Law, 43 HARV. EDUc. REV. 487, 490 (1973).
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INS maintaining custody. Instead of reviewing the regulation under a
heightened form of scrutiny, a rational relationship is considered
sufficient.300
The foregoing approach denies liberty and dignity to the class,
normally the benchmark of constitutional due process. A straightfor-
ward approach could be obtained by reliance on the existence of the
plenary power, but this would signal a diminution in the status of the
children to less than persons.3 0 1 Accomplishing this same goal by
cloaking the class with the good children description shifts the focus-
from the right to the class-by allowing the Court to narrowly draw
the right and apply a lower standard of constitutional review. The
INS then prevails with the simple claim that it is acting in the best
interest of the children.31 This claim receives little scrutiny.30 3
In the procedural due process context, the majority describes the
class as juveniles to minimize concerns for vulnerability and effectuate
punishment-in the form of indefinite detention-that occurs by the
Court's refusal to consider deficiencies in the ability of members of
the class to request a hearing.3° The rights are diminished by describ-
ing the challenge as a facial one that will fail even if one juvenile is
assumed capable of exercising the request for a hearing. 30 5 This is de
facto punishment for alien juveniles, which also undermines the unac-
companied minor's constitutional protections.
A preferable method would apply constitutional rights on a case-
by-case basis, taking the facts of the case into account from the child's
perspective and ability level. 316 By recasting the issues in a manner
that does not automatically defer to the parents or the state30 7 or ex-
300. See Keith, supra note 11, at 190.
301. See supra note 13.
302. This claim is illusive, as demonstrated by the terms and conditions for confinement
agreed to by the INS in 1992, several years after deplorable conditions were revealed. See
generally CHILD WELFARE ADVISORY GROUP, WORKING GROUP ON MINORS IN DETEN-
TION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FOR
CARE OF MINORS (1992) (raising many of the same concerns as the Flores plaintiffs) (on
file with author).
303. In fact, the INS claims the administrative and economic inability to conduct in-
home studies, even though the cost of the study would be far less than the cost of deten-
tion. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1452 (1993).
304. Scharf & Hess, supra note 49, at 123-27 (summarizing the inability of minors to
request a hearing).
305. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1451.
306. A similar approach is taken in abortion cases with minors. See, e.g., Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643.44 (1979) (requiring a proceeding to determine whether a female
juvenile is mature enough to make the abortion decision in consultation with a physician).
307. Accord John Coons et al., Puzzling Over Children's Rights, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
307, 341.
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tend rights when punishment is the goal, a more just due process anal-
ysis emerges. This approach would consider the strengths and
weaknesses of the child's reasoning ability in the particular circum-
stances to determine whether rights should be extended. Of course,
such an approach challenges the courts and the parties, but it also cre-
ates a more just system of due process. As applied to Flores, the chil-
dren would be able to say whether they want to be released to
someone other than their parents, a question omitted from the current
analysis.
Substantive due process has meaning when the application of a
strict scrutiny analysis is applied to the regulation. The due process
rights of the children are furthered under this analysis because the
vulnerability of the class does not automatically require a narrowing
of the alleged right. Rather than classifying the right as release to an
unrelated adult, which would not be in the best interest of a vulnera-
ble child, the courts would have to look at the result of nonrelease-
indefinite detention. When the focus is on that result, it is clear there
is a right to "[f]reedom from bodily restraint[; which] has always been
at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. '30 8
The procedural due process analysis also requires an examination
of the minors' ability to exercise their choice, remembering their
unique status as persons who are not adults.309 Because children are
limited by their age and maturity, the procedural due process ex-
tended to them must be tailored to the ability of the particular individ-
ual in the specific case to make self-determinations. 31° This method
allows the Court to acknowledge the unique concerns and differences
of children's ability,311 and assures that children who lack the neces-
sary skills are not forced to exercise rights.312 Due process is a right
that can be measured by the circumstances of the case. A due process
308. See Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1454 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
309. IL; see also Jerry Suls, Self-Awareness and Self-Identity in Adolescence, in THE
ADOLESCENT AS DEcisioN MAKER 143, 173 (Judith Worrell et al. eds., 1989) ("The phe-
nomena that are thought to be part of adolescence-self-consciousness, introspection, con-
fusion-are not necessarily simultaneous. Instead, they are manifested and worked out at
different times during the period from 12 to 18 or 21 years of age.").
310. Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgement and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37
ViLL. L. REv. 1607, 1665-67 (1992) (supporting the ability of adolescents to act with self-
determination). Contra John E. Coons et al., Deciding What's Best For Children, 7 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHIcS & Pun. PoL'Y 465, 489 (1993) (arguing limitations in children's ability
to choose require that the power to decide remain with parents or the state).
311. Accord Melton, supra note 26, at 157 ("The age threshholds for recognition of
autonomy and privacy, cessation of special age-based entitlement, and establishment of
criminal responsibility need not be, indeed should not be, the same.").
312. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 7, at 154.
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analysis that focuses on the abilities of the parties, therefore, will fur-
ther a just application of due process.
Conclusion
Children are persons within the meaning of the Constitution.
Under the current approach to due process, however, the liberty inter-
est ensured by the application of the "person" within the Constitution
is overshadowed by the interests of the parents or state to protect chil-
dren and society. When labeled as "good children," they are automat-
ically considered vulnerable, and thus are precluded from utilizing
their voice and constitutional rights because their interests are
subordinated to the will of parents or the state. This subordination
accords them no independent determination of the applicable consti-
tutional concerns and inappropriately restricts constitutional protec-
tion. Reliance on the parens patriae power or the best interest
analysis justifies a limitation on the child's right but fails to consider
the individual concerns of a detained child.
Children, such as those in the Flores case, are held in indefinite
detention by the approval of custody based on parens patriae con-
cerns articulated by the INS. This detention is not the same as liberty,
and custody which is "good enough" still infringes on liberty interests
in a manner that requires the application of substantive due process
protection. If the children in lores were given full constitutional rec-
ognition as persons, the outcome could not have summarily disre-
garded the liberty interest.313 This approach is preferable and
advances constitutional principles.
Today, the protection of society is the underlying social goal when
rights are granted to legitimize punishment. 314 By understanding that
the bad juvenile language is used as a method to extend rights to legit-
imize punishment against youths who are viewed as violent, we can
move from that approach and instead focus on the actual substantive
or procedural due process rights required to effectuate equal protec-
tion under the law. Thus, in the context of the Mores case, the major-
ity could not simply ascribe the bad juvenile characteristics to the class
as a method of justifying an extension of procedural due process to
313. Accord text accompanying supra note 308.
314. One commentator has noted that the loss of constitutional rights is attributable to
the Court employing "'juvenileness' to reach the conclusion that the young person loses."
Geimer, supra note 60, at 950.
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persons who are in fact incapable of exercising the right.3 15 Although
children are limited by their age and maturity, it is insufficient to rec-
ognize those limitations as an end to independent analysis.316 A more
appropriate solution would be to evaluate children's ability to exercise
rights as a prerequisite to the extension of rights. Then, if the children
are able to make self-determinations, they can exercise the rights
granted.1 7 This method allows the courts to acknowledge the unique
concerns and differences of each children's abilities. As applied in the
Flores case, the indefinite detention, which is seen by the child as pun-
ishment, could not continue if the child was truly able to invoke due
process protection.
Because children are persons in a constitutional and real sense,
we must accord them justice by applying a fact-based analysis of their
ability to effectively exercise due process rights. The actual injury and
ability of each child should be evaluated to promote dignity and dem-
ocratic ideals.
315. For an argument that the rights cannot be effectively exercised, see supra notes
266, 269, 290 and accompanying text.
316. Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights, supra note 61, at 1168.
317. See supra notes 307, 310 and accompanying text.
